The Judicial Ethics Forum (JEF)

An Academic Discussion of Judicial Ethics, Discipline & Disqualification

Warning the Public About Judge Keller

Posted by kswisher on Saturday, July, 17, 2010

In a surprising, but just, twist, the Texas Commission of Judicial Conduct  — contrary to the ambivalent findings of its special master — has issued a “public warning” against Presiding Judge Sharon Keller for the time when she let a capital defendant be executed notwithstanding meritorious grounds for a stay (for a more detailed account of her actions, see the earlier post here).  Among other violations, the Commission found that Keller violated Canon 3B(7) (renumbered 3B(8) in the Texas Code), for failing to accord the defendant and his lawyers the right to be heard according to law.  She may appeal.  In addition to this public shaming, this controversy ultimately caused the Texas Ethics Commission (a separate regulatory body) to investigate Keller’s financial disclosure statements, and on finding significant failures to disclosure, it levied a record fine of $100,000 against her.  

Read the public warning here; and read the order imposing the fine here

UPDATE: In yet another twist, a Texas special court of review dismissed the charging document on the ground that the state constitution does not permit the sanction of “public warning,” only “censure” (and recommendations for retirement or removal).  The court did not “express an opinion concerning the merits of the accusations against Judge Keller,” but its disposition effectively precludes the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct from re-charging her.  That disposition makes little sense to me in this context, provided that the re-charging and prosecution were to accord her due process (an issue obviously not addressed or perhaps even ripe).  The local news station has linked to the full opinion here

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

A Court Divided

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Saturday, July, 3, 2010

The growing rift between liberal and conservative justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court has once again caused indecision.  This time, the issue was whether Justice Gableman should be disciplined for the misleading advertisement that his campaign committee aired against former Justice Butler.  Butler had long ago been a public defender, represented a criminal defendant on appeal, won at the court of appeals level, but lost at the supreme court level.  The client then served his time, but regrettably committed another serious offense after he was released from prison.  From these facts, the campaign committee somehow crafted the following television attack ad, which Justice Gableman reviewed and approved: “Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the street. Like Reuben Lee Mitchell, who raped an 11-year-old girl with learning disabilities. Butler found a loophole. Mitchell went on to molest another child.”  [See the full ad here.] 

In short, the three liberal justices found disciplinable conduct in the ad’s misleading speech (opinion, here); the three conservative justices found the ad “distasteful” but not disciplinable (opinion, here).  Now, the judicial conduct authorities do not know what to do with this tie. 

This same three-three split occurred recently in the much-followed case of State v. Allen, in which a criminal defendant moved to disqualify Gableman (in part for the remarks above).  The resulting deadlock meant that the motion to disqualify was effectively denied.  And as a final example, the split essentially caused the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s anomalous Caperton response (or more accurately, nonresponse); see earlier post for details. 

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal | 1 Comment »

Judicial Ethics on the Campaign Trail

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Monday, June, 21, 2010

The Seventh Circuit weighed in last week on three common judicial ethics rules governing campaigns.  Readers may recall that the Seventh Circuit is not shy about shaking things up in this area.  [See Buckley v. Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993) (striking down announce clause well before White came along).]  To misappropriate Monroe Freedman’s famous term from another context, this new opinion is the latest in the growing “trilemma” of reconciling the First Amendment, Judicial Elections, and Impartiality (including its due process element).  The rules at issue this time around had prohibited three campaign practices: (1) joining a party; (2) endorsing partisan candidates; and (3) directly soliciting campaign contributions.  According to the court, this is how each rule fares, respectively: (1) unconstitutional; (2) constitutional; and (3) constitutional.  The full opinion, with dissent, can be found here (Siefert v. Alexander).  Readers may recall that the district court in early 2009 struck down all three prohibitions under First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis. 

Posted in Canon 4, Canon 5, Judicial Campaigns | 2 Comments »

New Works in the Articles Archive

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Tuesday, June, 1, 2010

N.B. Several new articles — primarily addressing Caperton and its aftermath — appear on the Articles page.   

Posted in Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: McKoski on the Appearance of Impropriety Standard

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Tuesday, June, 1, 2010

Judge Ray McKoski has just published a thorough work on the ever-controversial appearance of impropriety standard.  Here is the abstract: 

Judges are required to forego a litany of professional and personal behaviors deemed to be inconsistent with the role of the neutral magistrate. For example, codes of judicial conduct prohibit ex parte communications, the misuse of office, public commentary on prohibited topics, and participation in certain social, religious, and political activities.

In addition to specific rules barring actual improprieties, it is commonly believed that a broader disciplinary standard is necessary to fully safeguard the public’s faith in the judiciary. As a result, under virtually every state judicial code, discipline may be imposed upon a judge for conduct which may not violate a particular rule but which is thought to create “an appearance of impropriety.”

This Article examines the disciplinary use of the appearance of impropriety standard from a theoretical and practical standpoint. The history and development of the standard is explored together with the most debated aspect of the rule—whether the “appearance of impropriety” prohibition can survive a vagueness challenge. The inescapable conclusion is that it cannot. A cost-benefit analysis further discloses that the disadvantages of the rule clearly outweigh its oft-touted but, nevertheless, illusory benefits. It is proposed that the use of the appearance standard as a disciplinary rule should be discontinued or, in the alternative, that a limiting construction should be placed on the “appearance of impropriety” thereby supplying the specificity needed to meet due process requirements.

Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1914 (2010).

Posted in Canon 1, Canon 2 | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: Sample on Caperton and Post-Caperton State Court Reform

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Saturday, May, 22, 2010

Professor James Sample (Hofstra), formerly of Brennan Center fame, has just completed two fine works on Caperton and state court responses.  Here is the abstract to the first, which provides a good current-events survey of post-Caperton developments and can be found in this year’s Joint American Judicature Society-Drake Law Review Symposium:

This Article considers the significant state court reform developments in the year following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., as well as ancillary federal developments, including renewed congressional interest in judicial disqualification. Picking up on the author’s view that “paradoxically for a decision overturning a state justice’s non-recusal, the majority’s approach is a model of cooperative federalism,” the Article focuses primarily on the initial developments pertaining to money in the courts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and West Virginia in the short period since the decision. The Article notes that while recusal practices have certainly been one focal point of developments in the states, Caperton has also provided a significant boost to judicial public financing. After considering tangible developments in the three identified states, the Article briefly points to more nascent judicial independence efforts in other states, in which Caperton connections are less direct, but where the case is nonetheless figuring prominently in rejuvenated efforts to modify judicial selection practices. The Article asserts that, while not all of the post-Caperton developments have improved the judicial impartiality landscape, on balance, the decision is already producing meaningful improvements in protecting the courts from the influence of money.

James J. Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 Drake L. Rev. 787 (2010).  Featured in Syracuse Law Review’s Caperton Symposium (which, by the way, contains several other good reads), Professor Sample’s second article makes the provocative claim, among others, that Caperton is a model of federalism.  James J. Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 293 (2010). 

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Impending Judicial Ethics Symposium

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Wednesday, March, 17, 2010

The University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law is hosting a judicial ethics symposium shortly — April 9-10, 2010.  Some greats will be presenting, including Mark Harrison and Charlie Geyh (among others).   

Here are the panel topics:

  • The Ethical Judge
  • Judicial Elections, Financing and the Independence of the Bench
  • The California Commission for Impartial Courts
  • Roundtable – Judges, (in)Civility and the Media
  • Regulating Ethics: Judicial Education and Codes of Conduct
  • Ethics for Judges and Tribunals: An International Perspective

For the detailed Program, click here.

For more information or to RSVP: go.mcgeorge.edu/JudicialEthics

Posted in Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Judicial discipline in 2009

Posted by graycynthia on Monday, February, 1, 2010

In 2009, four judges or former judges were removed from office as a result of state judicial discipline proceedings (in one of those cases, the judge was permanently disbarred, effectively removing him from office).  In addition, one former part-time judge was permanently barred from serving in any judicial capacity, and one judge was suspended without pay until the end of his term.  Seven judges resigned (or agreed not to run at the expiration of their terms) in lieu of discipline pursuant to agreements with judicial conduct commissions that were made public.  (These figures do not include proceedings pending before a state supreme court.)

95 additional judges (or former judges in seven cases) received other public sanctions in 2009.  In approximately 53 of those cases, the discipline was imposed pursuant to the consent of the judge.  In addition to the sanction, in some of those cases, the judges were ordered to complete judicial ethics training, were placed on probation and required to complete a mentorship, or were barred from seeking judicial office in the state again.

There were 13 suspensions without pay, ranging from 30 days to one year.  One suspension also included a reprimand, one included a reprimand and censure, and one included a reprimand as an attorney.

In addition, 21 judges were publicly censured; 37 were publicly reprimanded (one reprimand also included a $25,000 fine); 15 were publicly admonished; and five received public warnings.

Two private reprimands were made public with the judge’s agreement.  In one case, a judge was ordered to establish his primary residence in the county where the law required that he reside.  Bar discipline authorities sanctioned one former judge for conduct on the bench.

To compare, in 2008, 13 judges were removed; 1 former judge was permanently barred; 1 judge was found to be permanently disabled; 1 was permanently retired; 2 were suspended with pay until the end of their terms; 11 judges resigned or retired pursuant to public agreements; and 114 judges or former judges received other public sanctions.  Between 1980 and the end of 2008, approximately 367 state judges had been removed from office as a result of state judicial discipline proceedings.

Posted in Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Congressional Hearings on Disqualification and Impeachment

Posted by kswisher on Wednesday, January, 20, 2010

Last month, the House Courts Subcommittee and the Task Force on Judicial Impeachment addressed two pressing issues: (1) the rules of disqualification post-Caperton and (2) the impeachment of Judge Porteous.  Helpfully, both hearings are captured on video, feature the appearances of a few of the true experts on these subjects, and include links to their written testimony.  The point of this post is neutral reportage, but to editorialize just a bit: Some interesting testimony lurks in these links (take, for example, that of Professor Eugene Volokh [UCLA] whose mostly entertaining written testimony on the state of disqualification law somewhat shockingly recommends no particular action and doubts the existence of serious problems, at least of the type that could be remedied through disqualification law).

(1) Hearing on Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T. Massey

(a) To watch the hearing, click here (which may require RealPlayer);

(b) To view the written testimony, click on the name of the respective witness:

M. Margaret McKeown
U.S. Courts of Appeals
Ninth Circuit
Charles G. Geyh
Associate Dean of Research
John F. Kimberling Professor of Law
Indiana University, Maurer School of Law
Richard E. Flamm
Author of Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges; Conflicts of Interest and Law Firm Disqualification
Eugene Volokh
Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law
University of California
Norman L. Reimer
Executive Director
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Arthur D. Hellman
Professor of Law
University of Pittsburgh

 

(2) Hearing to Consider Possible Impeachment of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Part IV

(a) To watch the hearing, click here (which may require RealPlayer);

(b) To view the written testimony, click on the name of the respective witness:

Akhil R. Amar
Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science
Yale Law School
Charles G. Geyh
Associate Dean for Research and the John F. Kimberling Professor of Law
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Michael J. Gerhardt
Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor in Constitutional Law & Director, Center for Law and Government
University of North Carolina School of Law

Posted in Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Two Comments on Extrajudicial Comments

Posted by kswisher on Wednesday, December, 16, 2009

There have been (at least) two interesting developments of late in the world of judges’ extrajudicial commentary about their pending cases.  First, Massachusetts loosened its former prohibition on extrajudicial comments in primarily two ways: (1) judges may now respond publicly about their “conduct” in a pending matter, so long as their response is unrelated to the merits of the matter; and (2) judges may now issue an explanatory memorandum, in which they elaborate on their reasons for a previous ruling, so long as the memorandum is not “issued solely to respond to public criticism of the decision” and does “not rely on any information that was not within the record before the judge at the time of the underlying order.”  It might be disputed whether these amendments substantively change black-letter canon law to any significant extent, but they certainly make what is permitted more explicit.  The chief change to the text of the Massachusetts Code is new subsection (D) of Canon 3B(9):

A judge is permitted to make public comment concerning his or her conduct provided that such comments do not reasonably call into question the judge’s impartiality and do not address the merits of any pending or impending judicial decision. 

The full text of the amendment can be found here, and the reports of the ad hoc committee that inspired the amendment can be found here (that committee, however, split on its recommendation to the Supreme Judicial Court, with a majority of the committee recommending a more dramatic loosening of the rules than what the court ultimately adopted).  For a favorable discussion of the Massachusetts’ amendment and a somewhat unfavorable discussion of the amendment’s counterpart in the new Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.10(E), see Mark I. Harrison & Keith Swisher, When Judges Should Be Seen, Not Heard: Extrajudicial Comments Concerning Pending Cases and the Controversial Self-Defense Exception in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, 64 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 559 (2009).  Coincidently, that article was cited by the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in the Michael Vick case — White v. NFL, 585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2009) — which brings me to the second development in extrajudicial commenting.

In the White (Vick) case, the court was faced with the question whether the district judge should have recused himself from the proceedings.  The reasons for that question included that the judge (i) had posed for a press picture holding a football in his robe, (ii) had claimed publicly that the NFL team owners (i.e., one of the parties) complain about his rulings “yet even though they complain about it, . . . all they’ve done is make tons of money,” and (iii) had met ex parte with team representatives (but not team owners) before several proceedings.  Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that — although there was a “danger” in the judge’s behavior and although the judge would have been “well advised not to opine publicly about his role” in related proceedings — he did not violate the prohibition on extrajudicial comments.  Id. at 1140-41.  In judicial ethics opinions, this dichotomy arises quite frequently; a judge’s conduct will be held “inadvisable” under the Canons, but not violative of them.  There is some support for this two-track system — namely, that some violations are violations and some are just “inadvisable” or “imprudent” — in the Preamble to most Codes, but is this two-track system transparent and fair?  Would and should, for instance, a criminal or civil defendant receive the benefit of this vague second track for some lesser violations of criminal or civil law?   

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal | Leave a Comment »

Facebooking in Florida

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Wednesday, December, 16, 2009

Prof. Ilya Somin has posted some interesting commentary on the new(er) Florida judicial ethics opinion addressing judges “friending” attorneys on Facebook.  Prof. Somin’s commentary can be found here (at the Volokh Conspiracy); and the full text of the judicial ethics opinion can be found here.  The opinion has already received national attention, and consequently, the point of this post is primarily just to give the readers the preceding links in the somewhat unlikely event that they have not yet heard of this controversial opinion. 

UPDATE: For the contrary view, see Ohio’s advisory opinion here.  To learn about a judge who crossed the line with Facebook, among other things, through ex parte contacts and other transgressions in a pending matter, see here

Posted in Canon 1, Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: Swisher on Tough-on-Crime Judges

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Monday, November, 30, 2009

Prof. Keith Swisher has posted a draft of his forthcoming article on pro-prosecution judges, judicial elections, and disqualification.  Here is the abstract:

In this Article, I take the most extensive look to date at pro-prosecution judges and ultimately advance the following, slightly scandalous claim: Particularly in our post-Caperton, political-realist world, “tough on crime” elective judges should recuse themselves from all criminal cases. The contextual parts to this claim are, in the main, a threefold description: (i) the “groundbreaking” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal decision, its predecessors, and its progeny; (ii) the judicial ethics of disqualification; and (iii) empirical and anecdotal evidence of pro-prosecution (commonly called “tough on crime”) campaigns and attendant electoral pressures. Building on this description and the work of empiricists, we bridge the gap between these tough-on-crime campaign promises and subsequent tough-on-crime adjudications. And in the final analysis, the thesis — namely, that tough-on-crime judges should recuse themselves in most, and probably all, criminal cases in light of personal and systemic biases — is corroborated not just by Supreme Court reasoning and language, but even more importantly (at least from my perspective as an ethics professor), by the rules of judicial ethics. Thus, pro-prosecution judges and their not-too-sophisticated message — “me tough on crime, you soft on crime” — should cease and desist or be ceased and desisted.

Parts.  Part I briefly describes elective judicial selection systems and thoroughly describes “tough-on-crime” judges, their messages, and their motivations. Part II, the core of the analysis, runs tough-on-crime judges through the constitutional, ethical, and other-legal frameworks of disqualification. All of these frameworks — some four or five different legal and ethical barriers, depending on one’s jurisprudential view — ultimately lead to the same place, mandatory disqualification. Part III critically appraises elective systems, the theoretical and economical costs that those systems impose on judges and litigants, and the alternatives, including broadly or narrowly targeted disqualification, public financing, and forced silence. By the Conclusion, the analysis has pointed strongly toward a broad-based, mandatory-disqualification remedy.

Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).  A link to which can also be found in Articles

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally, Judicial Selection | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: Rotunda on Oversight of the Federal Judiciary

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Monday, November, 30, 2009

Professor Rotunda has recently published his proposal for an Inspector General for the Federal Courts, as part of a symposium issue on judicial ethics.  Here is an abstract: 

Many federal judges routinely fear criticism, but that fear is unwarranted. The public is rightly concerned that the procedure to investigate and discipline problem-judges is flawed, particularly in a few high-profile cases discussed in this article. Several recent indictments of federal judges add to the problem. As Judge Ralph Winter has acknowledged, the status quo is “not a confidence builder”. Judges should welcome an Inspector General for the Federal Courts, who could restore public confidence in the federal judicial discipline system. The Inspector General can investigate potential ethical violations and proceed in those few instances where more is needed. This solution is something that both the public and the judiciary should welcome. Congress can create an Inspector General with appropriate safeguards that will keep our judiciary independent (because no one favors a dependent judiciary) and will keep our judiciary accountable (because no one favors a judiciary that is above the law).

Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, And a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 301 (2009).  A link to which can also be found in Articles.

Posted in Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Something Is Rotten in the State of Wisconsin

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Tuesday, November, 24, 2009

The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently became the first state court to take post-Caperton, rule-based action.  (Michigan recently became the second; for more information, click here.)  Putting the merits to the side — ignoring them altogether, actually — the Wisconsin Supreme Court should be commended for taking expeditious action following the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking Caperton decision.  The praise ends there, unfortunately.  In a puzzling, recalcitrant move, the court adopted two rule amendments that appear to ignore both Caperton and its interpretation of the Due Process Clause.  Combining the amendments, they essentially state that contributions or expenditures — from any source and irrespective of amount — to elective judges in Wisconsin do not alone warrant recusal/disqualification.  That is not a brief restatement, but rather, a nearly exhaustive statement of the amendments (to verify, click here and here for the full text of the adopted amendments).  A state supreme court rule purporting to limit the reach of Caperton and constitutional due process seems anomalous; how such amendments are anything but scoffing and heel-digging remains to be explained.  Interestingly, the vote of the court was a deep split of 4-3, with Justice Gableman in the majority. 

One point of caution, at this early stage, is that we are reading from mere tealeaves.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not as yet published its orders or issued a press release.  One can hope that the court will explicate in what ways, if any, these amendments constitute learned contributions to the law of disqualification. 

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal | 2 Comments »

Torture and Humiliation in Ohio

Posted by kswisher on Monday, September, 14, 2009

Associated Press and other national media have seized on a story of an Ohio judge who ordered that a defendant’s mouth be duct-taped shut.  I have been avoiding blogging about the incident for several reasons, the most relevant of which is that such scandalous stories happen (too) often on the bench (and elsewhere), often within the lowest of court tiers within the state system.  (Think New York, for example, with its rather large number of discipline cases involving town and village court justices.)  In short, if we were to blog about every outlying wart of a judge, it probably would bog down the blog in negativity, and as negativity often hopes, little rational discussion would result.  (For a more rational discussion of outlier judges, see for example Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 431 (2004).)  This story, however, has caused me to lose too much sleep over the last two weeks to suppress it.  A disclaimer is in order, then: If you would like to avoid negativity today, or if you value your sleep more than I do, do not read on. 

The lead-in facts are simple, particularly because they are repeated in hundreds of criminal courtrooms every day.  A man charged with shoplifting, perhaps among other charges, is rotting in jail.  While there, he naturally wonders where is his court-appointed attorney, what is she doing, why is she not visiting him, and when (if ever) will he be released pending trial (or plea bargain).  Indeed, from the time that the defendant is jailed to the time of the preliminary hearing, his court-appointed attorney spends only “three minutes” with him.  One in his shoes would understandably be irate with the criminal justice system, if not with the attorney as well.  (I remember hearing something once or twice in the greatest-country-on-earth lines that we here are presumed innocent and, not surprisingly in such a country, we have an opportunity for bail.)  For our purposes, suffice it to say that a typical defendant, like Harry Brown (the part criminal defendant, part victim of our story), would be supremely irritated by the time his preliminary hearing arrived and no one had tried to secure his release (or at a minimum, explain why release would not be forthcoming).  At his next appearance before the court, he would almost surely voice his frustration with this court-appointed arrangement.  He would expect — perhaps be entitled? — to appear before a judge who is courteous and listens to his views.  See, e.g., Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, R. 2.8(B) (2009) (“A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, . . . and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control.”).  Indeed, the “duty to hear all proceedings with patience and courtesy is not inconsistent with the duty imposed in Rule 2.5 to dispose promptly of the business of the court.”  Id. cmt. 1; see also id. R. 2.6 (ensuring each party the right to be heard according to law).   

With that wind-up, you must listen for yourself to the audio recording of the proceeding, which is short and bitter.  It can be found here (click on the Audio tab after the page opens).  You will hear that (1) the judge attempted no less-humiliating alternatives than duct-tape (save one verbal warning); (2) the defendant, while frustrated, was not disrespectful or profane; (3) the defendant offered to sit back with the other in-custody defendants, but (4) the judge demanded that duct-tape be forced over the defendant’s mouth.  You will not hear (1) the judge concerned with whether duct-tape can suffocate a person (it can), (2) whether forcefully removing duct-tape, which the judge ordered a few minutes later, will inflict pain (it does), or (3) any clear indication that this judge respects human beings.  In closing, you will hear the judge add injury to injury by giving the defendant thirty days for contempt and then cracking a joke about the matter.  All of this is particularly shocking because the judge has a long history of formal legal training — he is not a nonlawyer lower-court justice who occasionally shoots from the hip and renders “rough justice.”  (The judge’s bio can be found here.)

Of course, it almost goes without saying that you must judge this judge for yourself — these are just my opinions from listening to the audio recording.  But remember my earlier point about negativity and lack of rational discussion — if your opinion does differ from mine, this is one time in which your opinion, while welcome, will not sway mine.  In fact, I am teaching torts this semester, and we cover that great tort of outrage (aka intentional infliction of emotional distress).  This cruel ritual reminds me like no other of the Restatement’s famous formulation of that tort:

Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘‘Outrageous!’’

Although the judge is donned with judicial immunity and consequently cannot face judgment for the tort of outrage (or battery), trustfully the Ohio disciplinary regime is listening.  To close this vent, if we never again hear of a judge duct-taping another litigant, it will be too soon.     

Posted in Canon 2, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Scalia and Death of the Innocent

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Tuesday, August, 25, 2009

The following is an exchange with a colleague about Dershowitz’s attack on Scalia regarding the death penalty for an innocent defendant (that Scalia betrayed his Catholicism). 

My colleague’s response:

Although I cannot, of course, speak for the Justice himself, I do think that I have managed to stumble upon a worthy response to Dershowitz’s attack.  Here goes.

For starters, one must distinguish (under traditional Catholic moral theology) between active cooperation in doing evil, versus merely failing to intervene in order to do some good.  The former is ordinarily prohibited; the latter is rarely mandated.

In the death penalty hypo set forth by Scalia, it would not be the Supreme Court ordering any particular individual to his or her death.  Rather, for the Supreme Court, we have instead the question of whether the Supreme Court ought to intervene in order to supercede some other court’s imposition of capital punishment.  Thus, I do not see here any question regarding active cooperation with evil, but rather simply the failure to intervene in order to do some good.  As stated, the obligation to so intervene is rarely mandated.

Moreover, Aquinas teaches that all of us must act within the limits of our authority – even when it comes to doing good:

If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.

Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q 64 art. 6, rep. ob. 3 (“Mirror of Justice” blog).

As Scalia sees it, under our federalist system, and under his interpretation of the constitution, the Supreme Court does not possess the authority to set aside a death penalty sentence in a situation where the defendant has had a fair trial.  Thus, even if he were inclined to intervene to “do good” here to spare an innocent man or woman his or her life, he is simply not authorized to do so.  An effort to go beyond his authority to achieve such a noteworthy aim would violate the fundamental natural law principle that the ends may not be used to justify the means.

Scalia has articulated the very same approach with regard to the issue of abortion, as he has made clear in several statements and audiences.  He believes that Roe v. Wade is bad law not because the constitution is a “pro-life” document, but rather because he interprets the constitution as being silent on the question of abortion.  For that reason he has said that he would uphold, and not strike down, a state law protecting a “women’s right to choose,” for he sees himself as unauthorized to act on the question of abortion one way or another.

Again, one could argue that as a professed Catholic, Scalia ought to do whatever he can to abolish or limit the practice of abortion.  But, again, Aquinas teaches that one ought not act beyond one’s authority – even to accomplish a perceived good.  This would justify Scalia’s “hands off” policy towards state abortion law.

Thus, although condemning an innocent man or woman to death certainly violates Catholic teaching (as does the procuring of an abortion), the Supreme Court is not actively cooperating with these “evils,” but rather merely failing to intervene to stop them.  Moreover, this failure to intervene is not, in Scalia’s mind, mandated by the Supreme Court’s limited authority within our federalist system of government.

In short, then, it would seem as though Scalia’s jurisprudence is consistent with the Catholic natural law tradition.

* * * * *

My reply:

Many thanks for an extremely thoughtful comment.

I was not comfortable with Dershowitz’s reference to Scalia’s religion.  Just as the Devil can cite Scripture, every religious person can interpret religious doctrine in a way that is consistent with a particular point of view.  I don’t mean that in a cynical way, but simply in recognition of the fact that there are so many denominations, sects, branches, and orders – all interpreting the same or similar texts, often in radically different ways.  I have no doubt that there are many Jews who support capital punishment, just as there are many who oppose it.  Also, many who would concur with Aquinas’ analysis, just as there are many who would oppose it.

But let’s apply Aquinas to Scalia.  As you say with reference to Aquinas, one ought not act “beyond one’s authority.”  In addition, Aquinas said that the judge should exercise “great care” in attempting to free the innocent man.  Only if the judge “cannot” succeed in freeing the innocent man – only if doing so is “impossible” – does the judge not sin.

The question then becomes whether it was “impossible” for Scalia to vote to free the innocent man within the bounds of his authority.  Only then would he be escaping sin.

Scalia opposes using the Due Process Clause to limit the states’ use of punitive damages in tort cases.  See, e.g., BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Nevertheless, in a later case he recognized that he had the discretion, on the basis of stare decisis, to limit the punitive damages against Exxon for a major oil spill, and he voted to do so even though he continued to believe that the holding was in error.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).

Moreover, Scalia has recognized that the Supreme Court has an established “death is different” jurisprudence.  He disapproves of it, but he recognizes it as stare decisis.  In addition, the Court has held that it is a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to put someone in jail for the “crime” of being addicted to drugs, analogizing it to the cruel and unusual punishment of putting someone in jail for a single day for the “crime” of having a common cold.  Robinson v. California, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 1421 (1962).

Accordingly, it would not have been “impossible” for Scalia, to vote to free the innocent man.  All he would have had to do would have been to exercise his admitted power, through stare decisis, to recognize that death is different, that saving a life is therefore more important than saving a corporation money (when, indeed, Exxon was not innocent), and that it is cruel and unusual punishment to put a man to death for the “crime” of having had a fair trial.

According to Aquinas, therefore, since Scalia failed to exercise great care, within his authority, to save an innocent human life, he sinned against Church doctrine.  More important, entirely apart from religious doctrine, he failed as a human being and as a Supreme Court Justice.  [To view Scalia’s dissent in full, click here.]

By: Monroe Freedman, Hofstra Law

Posted in Judicial Ethics Generally | 1 Comment »

Pro se litigants

Posted by graycynthia on Wednesday, August, 19, 2009

In a recent judicial discipline decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court gave a persuasive description of the importance of respectful judicial demeanor in the courtroom, particularly in cases involving pro se litigants. In re Ellender (Louisiana Supreme Court July 1, 2009). Based on a statement of stipulated uncontested material facts and stipulated conclusions of law, the Court suspended a judge for 30 days without pay for his treatment of the petition at a hearing on a petition for protection from abuse for suggesting that the pleading alleging domestic abuse was inconsequential, suggesting approval of the infliction of severe corporal punishment on a child, and acknowledging he did not appropriately address the father’s statement about whipping his child.

Most of the current justices on the court have experience on the trial bench so they understand the challenges faced by trial court judges.

Judges are called upon to render difficult decisions in sensitive and emotional matters. . . . Often a judge’s patience is tested when simultaneously confronted with crowded dockets to be managed and countless difficult decisions to be made. Litigants occasionally lash out at the judge if their side does not prevail, inappropriately casting aspersions on the judge. . . .

In donning the judicial robe, judges are not suddenly cloaked with faultlessness. Thus, judges cannot be subjected to discipline merely because someone mistakes decisiveness, forcefulness, or sternness for a lack of patience, dignity, or courtesy.

However, the justices were also able to empathize with those on the other side of the bench.

Being in court is a common occurrence for judges, but for litigants, especially pro se litigants, a courtroom appearance can be an immensely difficult experience. Litigants appear before judges to have their disputes resolved. Judges serve the public, in part, by setting an example in how to resolve these disputes in a patient, dignified, and courteous manner. If a judge acts belligerently, those before the judge believe belligerence is acceptable. Judges have an opportunity to teach by example and demonstrate those attributes which all should strive to possess.

* * * The lack of patience exhibited in this matter prevented a full consideration of the legitimacy of the allegations in the pleading, especially considering some of the complaints in the pleading were not addressed before the matter was summarily dismissed. There was a potential risk of serious harm stemming from this judicial misconduct in that the complainant was seeking protective relief from threatened violence in a domestic matter. Mrs. Warren appeared before Judge Ellender, unrepresented by counsel, asking the court for protection based on allegations of domestic abuse. The record is clear that Judge Ellender not only failed to treat this matter seriously, but he also acted in a condescending and demeaning manner toward Mrs. Warren and treated her with a lack of patience. While such behavior should not be tolerated with respect to any litigant, or attorney, the impact on domestic abuse litigants, and others who allege a need for the court’s protection, can be devastating.

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3 | Leave a Comment »

Call for Papers

Posted by graycynthia on Wednesday, August, 5, 2009

The Drake Law Review and the American Judicature Society are pleased to announce the Seventh Annual American Judicature Society-Drake Law Review Symposium Issue:  The State of Recusal: Judicial Disqualification, Due Process, and the Public’s Post-Caperton Perception of the Integrity of the Justice System.

The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. settled that due process requires an objective analysis of the question of judicial impartiality.   However, like most Supreme Court decisions, it raised as many questions as it answered.   Most obviously, the Caperton decision raised questions about the effects of judicial campaign spending on judges’ perceived and actual impartiality.  In addition, Caperton presents questions about the role of federal courts in ensuring impartiality in state courts.  And at the deepest level, the debate about judicial disqualification raises questions about due process guarantees in the context of elected judiciaries.   The debate over judicial disqualification should be broadened in light of these issues.   The Drake Law Review is seeking articles that address issues implicated by judicial disqualification, including, but not limited to, the following considerations:

• The First Amendment implications of the decision in Caperton;

• How state courts should implement the holding in Caperton in their codes of judicial conduct;

• The answers to Chief Justice Roberts’s 40 questions;

• The balance between the various competing values implicated by judicial disqualification;

• Issues relating to standards and procedures for judicial disqualification;

• The unique challenges relating to judicial disqualification in small jurisdictions and on appellate courts;

• The effect of judicial disqualification on the popular legitimacy of the judicial system.

Articles from all backgrounds will be considered, from academic evaluations of the law to empirical studies on judicial disqualification rules and procedures.   The Drake Law Review invites you to participate in this collaboration by submitting an article to be published in this highly regarded issue of the Review.   If you would like to participate in this unique collaborative effort, please contact the Editor in Chief of the Drake Law Review as soon as possible.   All general topic proposals must be submitted by December 4, 2009.   The deadline for completed articles is January 29, 2010.   Final decisions regarding publication are made by the Drake Law Review.  Drake Law Review, 2507 University Avenue Des Moines, Iowa 50311 Phone: (515) 271-2930; Fax: (515) 271-4926; email: law.review@drake.edu; http://students.law.drake.edu/lawreview

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Caperton Repercussions

Posted by graycynthia on Friday, July, 17, 2009

In addition to other repercussions, the U.S. Supreme Court’s June decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Energy, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), may help the states defend restrictions on political and campaign activity in their codes of judicial conduct.  Since the Court’s 2002 decision, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), numerous First Amendment lawsuits have been filed in federal courts, usually by right-to-life organizations, and many (although not all) have succeeded in overturning restrictions on what judges and judicial candidates can say, how they can raise funds, and whether they can be involved in other candidates’ campaign and partisan politics.  (For a discussion of the caselaw after White, click here.)

In the first post-Caperton decision, however, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana upheld the constitutionality of canons in Indiana’s revised code of judicial conduct that prohibit judges and judicial candidates from making pledges, promises, and commitments; require disqualification based on a prior commitment; prohibit judges and judicial candidates from acting as a leader or holding office in or making speeches on behalf of a political organization; and prohibit judges and judicial candidates from soliciting funds for, paying an assessment to, or making a contribution to a political organization or a candidate for public office and personally soliciting or accepting campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee.  Bauer v. Shepard, Opinion and Order (July 7, 2009).  The court relied in part on Caperton.

Although the parties disagree about what bearing the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton should have on this Court’s ruling in this case—the Supreme Court did after all repeatedly note the exceptional, extraordinary, and extreme facts of that case—Caperton does illustrate that judicial elections and judicial conduct (including the issue of recusal) can have important due process of law implications.  Additionally, the Caperton Court noted that the state codes of judicial conduct “serve to maintain the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law,” and it quoted approvingly the following statement from the amicus curiae brief filed by the Conference of Chief Justices:  “the codes are ‘[t]he principal safeguard against judicial campaign abuses’ that threaten to imperil ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.’” . . .  For the Court, a state’s interest in judicial integrity is “vital” and “of the highest order”:  “Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving disputes.  The power and the prerogative of a court to perform this function rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments.  The citizen’s respect for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court’s absolute probity.  Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the highest order.”

The court also relied extensively on the preamble and comments to the Indiana code, which were based on the ABA 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the Indiana preamble is identical to the model; the comments are not although they are similar).

Posted in Canon 4, Canon 5, Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Selection | Leave a Comment »

Judicial Politics

Posted by graycynthia on Thursday, July, 9, 2009

Although the litigation such as that necessary to resolve the Senate race between Al Franken and Norm Coleman is fortunately extremely rare, it demonstrates the importance of having a non-partisan judiciary available to resolve such conflicts. Fortunately for Minnesotans, their legislature has declared that judicial elections should be non-partisan, and the Minnesota Supreme Court has implemented that decision by adopting a code of judicial conduct that prohibits judges and judicial candidates from endorsing political candidates and engaging in other partisan activity.  Therefore, none of the justices on the Minnesota Supreme Court had to recuse themselves because they had endorsed Franken or Coleman (although two had to recuse because they were on the state-wide canvassing board), and the majority of the highest court in the state was available to do the job for which they were elected – decide the most important legal issues for the people of the state.  Fortunately, a federal court recently rejected a challenge to the Minnesota endorsement clause so that, if a similar situation arises in the future, the same protections will apply.  Wersal v. Sexton, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (District of Minnesota 2009).  The plaintiff in that case had argued that disqualification would protect judicial impartiality, but the court disagreed, focusing on the un-workability of recusal not in the rare case but “when a judge endorses an individual who is elected to a position where he or she is frequently a litigant.”

Wisconsin is not so fortunate, as a federal court there overturned the endorsement clause and other restrictions on partisan political activity even though judicial elections are supposed to be non-partisan by law.  Siefert v. Alexander, 597 F. Supp. 2d 860 (Western District of Wisconsin 2009).  The court believed the “gag order” was not “fooling anyone” because “many if not most judicial candidates have political lives before their judicial campaigns and often are easily identified as ‘Republican’ or ‘Democrat’ even if they do not explicitly run as such.” What the court fails to recognize is that by requiring judicial candidates to eschew party labels during the campaign, the code ensures that judicial candidates demonstrate their willingness to take on a new role and reject partisan loyalties and embrace judicial independence once on the bench.

Posted in Canon 4, Canon 5, Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal | Leave a Comment »