The Judicial Ethics Forum (JEF)

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Archive for the ‘Judicial Ethics Generally’ Category

New Scholarship: Goldschmidt and Stalans on Self-Represented Litigants and Perceived Fairness

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Thursday, February, 21, 2013

This piece features an interesting survey of Canadian lawyers and their perception of judges’ impartiality when judges assist self-represented litigants.  In addition to that continuing question of the appropriate level of assistance, the piece offers some comparative observations on the American and Canadian law and experience:

How much assistance should a trial judge provide a self-represented litigant [SRL] before the judge’s impartiality will be reasonably questioned? This question has been of continuing concern to both the bench and bar ever since the rise of the pro se litigation movement in the late 1990s, particularly in the context of “mixed” cases involving an SRL and a represented party. Case law and ethics codes provide inconsistent decisions and vague guidelines for judges, who must balance their duty to provide reasonable assistance with their duty to ensure a fair trial for all parties. This paper reports the results of a survey administered to 210 Canadian family law practitioners who were presented with 16 hypothetical scenarios involving an SRL and a represented party. Respondents indicated their views regarding the impartiality and helpfulness of the trial judge in each scenario, involving various procedural defaults by the SRL and different forms of judicial assistance or lack thereof. The results indicate that lawyers’ perceptions of a judge’s impartiality are affected, inter alia, by the favourability of the outcome for the SRL, and whether the assistance provided dealt with procedural or substantive matters. Future research is needed to determine whether a consensus can be established regarding perceptions of lawyers, lay persons, and judges regarding which forms of assistance are reasonable and required, permissible, or impermissible.

Jona Goldschmidt & Loretta Stalans, Lawyers’ Perceptions of the Fairness of Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants, Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2012.

Posted in Canon 2, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: Lubet and Diegel on Supreme Court Ethics Reform

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Thursday, February, 21, 2013

This fairly recent research paper seeks ethics and disqualification reform in the Supreme Court:

The United States Supreme Court is the only court in the United States without a clearly defined ethics code. In the wake of the controversy over possible leaks from justices’ chambers following the decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, and in light of legislation recently introduced in Congress, this paper suggests two reforms for the Supreme Court. First, the time has finally come for the Court to adopt a comprehensive Code of Conduct. Second, the Court should alter its current recusal practice – in which decisions are made exclusively by individual justices – and instead resolve disqualification motions by a vote of the full court.

Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks: Scotus Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius (Sept. 10, 2012).

Posted in Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: Benedetto Neitz on Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Tuesday, September, 25, 2012

Prof. Michele Benedetto Neitz (Golden Gate) has posted this insightful essay on judges’ implicit socioeconomic bias.  One of the essay’s motivators was Chief Judge Kozinski’s recent dissent from a denial of rehearing, in which he in effect accused the panel of socioeconomic bias.   See United States v. Pineda-Moreno (implying that the panel drove BMWs and engaged in “unselfconscious cultural elitism”).  Prof. Benedetto Neitz’s work can be viewed here, and the abstract follows:

Judges hold a prestigious place in our judicial system, and they earn double the income of the  average American household. How does the privileged socioeconomic status of judges affect their decisions on the bench? This article examines the ethical implications of what Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski recently called the “unselfconscious cultural elitism” of judges. This elitism can manifest as implicit socioeconomic bias.

Despite the attention paid to income inequality, implicit bias research and judicial bias, no other scholar to date  has fully examined the ramifications of implicit socioeconomic bias on the  bench. The article explains that socioeconomic bias may be more obscure than other forms of bias, but its impact on judicial decision-making processes can  create very real harm for disadvantaged populations. The article reviews social  science studies confirming that implicit bias can be prevalent even in people who profess to hold no explicit prejudices. Thus, even those judges who believe their wealthy backgrounds play no role in their judicial deliberations may be influenced by implicit socioeconomic bias. The article verifies the existence of implicit socioeconomic bias on the part of judges through examination of recent  Fourth Amendment and child custody cases. These cases reveal that judges can and do favor wealthy litigants over those living in poverty, with significant negative consequences for low-income people.

The article contends that the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the “Code”), the document designed to regulate the behavior of judges, fails to effectively eliminate implicit socioeconomic bias. The article recommends innovative revisions designed to strengthen the Code’s prohibition against bias, and suggests improvements to judicial training materials in this context. These changes will serve to increase judicial awareness of the potential for implicit socioeconomic bias in their judicial decisions, and will bring this issue to the forefront of the judicial agenda.

Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, Cleveland St. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013).

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Chief Judges and Ex Parte Contacts with Law Enforcement

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Tuesday, September, 25, 2012

Many readers are likely familiar with the Shalom Rubashkin case, which is now the subject of a short documentary.  The case involves many fascinating and frightening details, but of particular relevance are the ex parte contacts: the chief judge met for months with law enforcement planning the raid of Rubashkin’s business.  The judge did not disclose the extent of those planning sessions to the defendant or defense counsel; the contacts were instead revealed through a later public records request.   Ethics Experts Steve Gillers and Mark Harrison submitted affidavits indicating that both the prosecutors and the judge misstepped ethically.  The Supreme Court will soon consider whether to grant cert (it should), in a petition filed by Paul Clement.  The new documentary follows:

Additionally, some recent press about the film and the case can be viewed here.

Posted in Canon 2, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Leib et al. on Judges as Fiduciaries

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Friday, May, 11, 2012

Here is a very interesting new piece on judicial theory from Leib (Fordham) and coauthors.  The abstract follows:

For centuries, legal theorists and political philosophers have unsuccessfully sought a unified theory of judging able to account for the diverse, and oftentimes conflicting, responsibilities judges possess. How do we reconcile the call of judicial independence — a function of a judge’s obligation to uphold the rule of law — with that of judicial responsiveness — the obligation that, as a branch of government in a democratic polity, judges must ensure that the law not derogate too far from the will of the people? This paper reveals how the law governing fiduciary relationships sheds new light on this age-old quandary, and therefore, on the very nature of the judicial office itself. In so doing, the paper first explores the routinely overlooked, yet deeply embedded historical provenance of our judges-as-fiduciaries framework in American political thought and in the framing of the U.S. Constitution. It then explains why a fiduciary theory of judging offers important insight into what it means to be a judge in a democracy, while providing practical guidance in resolving a range of controversial and hotly contested legal issues surrounding judicial performance, such as judicial ethics at the Supreme Court, campaign contributions in state judicial elections, and the role of public opinion in constitutional interpretation.

For the full article, click here; Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013). 

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Swisher on Recusal and the Supreme Court’s Carrigan Decision

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Friday, May, 11, 2012

Prof. Swisher (Phoenix) has posted this essay about Carrigan, recusal, and related constitutional theory.  Here is the abstract:

Something good and something bad happened recently in government and judicial ethics; no one has truly noticed yet for some reason. The Supreme Court all but banned First Amendment analysis as applied to recusal laws, both legislative and judicial. That, actually, is the good thing, or so I argue. The bad thing is that the Court, in doing so, used a geriatric approach to constitutional theory. The approach is unduly reverent of anything “old;” and old is not limited to the practices of the Founding Fathers, but also includes “traditional” practices within some undefined range. But what is old is not necessarily wise, and a theory to the contrary leads to degenerative results in general and in ethics in particular, or so I argue further. I conclude with a return to the positive, hoping that the Court’s path may have inadvertently sparked a viable conceptual foundation for judicial recusal law and practice, which of course, have received much general press and scholarly attention of late.

For the full essay, click here; Keith Swisher, Recusal, Government Ethics, and Superannuated Constitutional Theory, 72 Md. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec. 2012). 

Posted in Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Geyh on Judicial Impartiality

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Friday, May, 11, 2012

The judicial ethics force known as Prof. Geyh (Indiana-Bloomington) has posted this interesting research on the differing uses of judicial impartiality.  Here is the abstract:

Scholars have traditionally analyzed judicial impartiality piecemeal, in disconnected debates on discrete topics. As a consequence, current understandings of judicial impartiality are balkanized and muddled. This article seeks to reconceptualize judicial impartiality comprehensively, across contexts. In an era when “we are all legal realists now,” perfect impartiality — the complete absence of bias or prejudice — is at most an ideal, with “impartial enough” becoming, of necessity, the realistic goal. Understanding when imperfectly impartial is nonetheless impartial enough is aided by conceptualizing judicial impartiality in three distinct dimensions: A procedural dimension in which impartiality affords parties a fair hearing; a political dimension in which impartiality promotes public confidence in the courts; and an ethical dimension in which impartiality is a standard of good conduct core to a judge’s self-definition. The seeming contradictions that cut across contexts in which judicial impartiality problems arise, can for the most part be explained with reference to the dimensions those problems inhabit and the constraints under which regulation in those dimensions are subject. Thus, being impartial enough to assure parties a fair hearing in the procedural dimension may or may not be impartial enough to satisfy the public in the political dimension, which may or may not be impartial enough to ensure that judges are behaving honorably in the ethical dimension. Analyzing partiality problems through the lens of the dimensions they occupy not only resolves many of the imponderables that have long plagued the subject, but also reveals a distinct trend, in which impartiality is being transformed from a value traditionally regulated largely by judges and the legal establishment in the procedural and ethical dimensions, to one that is increasingly the province of the political dimension, where it is regulated by the public and its elected representatives. By situating impartiality at the crossroads of judicial procedure, ethics and politics, this article offers a new perspective, not just on judicial impartiality, but also on the role of the American judiciary in the administration of justice and the political process.

For the full article, click here.

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The Chief Justice Ushers in the New Year with Superior Cheer

Posted by kswisher on Sunday, January, 15, 2012

Although admittedly old news by now, Chief Justice Roberts used his annual report to defend his Court’s indefensible lack of a judicial ethics code.  His defenses playfully distill into these three: (1) the other justices and I are good people so we do not need binding rules; (2) we and our court are special; and (3) ethics codes cannot guarantee ethical behavior (only the good people mentioned in (1) can do that).  The principle of ”a government of law and not of [wo/]men” was reversed. 

To read the report, which is only twelve pages, click here.  Interestingly, the report begins and ends with the well-known tale of Judge Landis, without discussing the various conflicts and appearances in that tale; it almost makes one wonder whether the Chief Justice would like to take on a second job as ”Commissioner of Baseball.” 

Posted in Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Membership, Discrimination, and Diversity

Posted by kswisher on Monday, December, 5, 2011

Canon 2C prohibits judges from “hold[ing] membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.”  Six months ago, we wrote about the sharply divided decision of the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council, which had concluded that Chief Bankruptcy Judge George Paine did not commit misconduct by remaining a member of an exclusively white-male country club.  The Judicial Conference of the United States has now officially disagreed.  In particular, its Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability reviewed the decision and “easily” determined that the judge’s country club “invidiously discriminates against women and African Americans for purposes of Canon 2C and, consequently, that Judge Paine’s membership in the organization runs afoul of that Canon.”

The opinion is worth a close read for many reasons, only two of which follow.  (It is interesting, for example, that the Committee twice criticizes the Sixth Circuit for failing to investigate fully the matter and thus basing its decision on incomplete information; the Committee then does nothing further and bases its decision on the same information.  But let’s leave that problem for another day and focus on the content of this important opinion.)  First, the opinion is worth reading for the footnotes.  As is often the case, textual footnotes are among the most thought-provoking (or sometimes mind-numbing) part of opinions.  On the point that the Sixth Circuit’s investigation was inadequate, for example, the Committee expressed regret that the Sixth Circuit ”appeared to resolve ambiguities in the record against the complainant.”  The Committee’s point is a good one, but is it clear that ambiguities (which invariably exist and persist) should be resolved in favor of complainants?  Perhaps the answer to that question should vary with the Canon at issue.  For Canon 2C, for instance, the respondent judge has voluntarily chosen to join or remain in the allegedly discriminatory organization, the judge will presumably have the best access to the organization’s membership rosters and policies, and the Canon is concerned in part with appearances.  In those circumstances, then, perhaps it might be permissible to shift the burden to the judge to prove that the organization does not discriminate — and perhaps that the organization also does not reasonably appear to discriminate. 

Canon 2C’s official commentary, on which the Committee later relied and built, does contain a form of burden-shifting when a judge joins or remains in a non-diverse organization, if “reasonable persons with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances would expect the membership would be diverse in the absence of invidious discrimination.”  “Relevant factors” in that regard ”include the size and nature of the organization and the diversity of persons in the locale who might reasonably be considered potential members.”  Here is the Committee’s application: “Nashville, Tennessee, is one of the major cosmopolitan cities of the Southern United States. In particular, it boasts a 27% African American population. Its female population is just over 50%. Although few organizations perfectly mirror the population trends of their surrounding locales, a member of the public would reasonably expect to see at least some women and African Americans among Belle Meade’s Resident Membership barring (1) invidious discrimination or (2) something unique about the Club — ‘such as that the organization is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic or cultural values of legitimate common interest to its members,’ [Canon 2C Commentary] — that would suggest otherwise. There is, however, nothing about Belle Meade’s stated aims or activities that provides any such justification for the total absence of any female or African American Resident Members. . . .  Naturally, there is no shortage of women or — as Judge Paine proclaimed in his 1990 letter to the Club’s Board — African Americans fitting that description.”  Thus, absent someone (presumably Judge Paine) coming forward with proof to the contrary (which is obviously unlikely in this case because Judge Paine believed that the club’s policies were indeed problematic), the judge’s membership may be determined to be misconduct.

Later in the footnotes, the Committee also conceded a bombshell: “To our knowledge, Canon 2C has never before been enforced.”  To place that statement in its context, Canon 2C, in its current form, has been on the books for twenty years.  Now, such shocking statements permit one’s optimistic or pessimistic nature to come out: judicial ethics regulation has finally matured to the point of enforcing a critical rule (and hopefully others like it) designed to ensure an actually and apparently impartial judiciary; or judicial ethics regulation has failed for twenty years to enforce such a critical rule.  Indeed, on the pessimistic side of the ledger, it is noteworthy that — despite finding a violation of Canon 2C — the Committee failed to impose any discipline:  because Judge Paine has expressed an intention to retire soon, and “because this decision represents the first enforcement of Canon 2C, there is no cause at this point for us to take disciplinary action.”  (Indeed, the Committee went further, proclaiming that the judge will retire with his “reputation . . . intact.”)  I have noticed this phenomenon several times in discipline decisions involving both lawyers and judges, although most of the cases are older ones.  The idea seems sound in a common-law based sanction regime: we should apply the (new) rule only retroactively because, in part, respondents necessarily could not have had notice of the rule in advance to guide their conduct.  The idea seems significantly less sound in a code-based sanction regime (i.e., the one that we have had for a long time): Canon 2C has always been publicly available and has always prohibited this behavior by its terms.  Why, then, do we give the first respondent a free pass?  We can come up with a few reasons, but because the Committee offered none (save the impending retirement), we have no one with which to argue.   

Yet another footnote is interesting and particularly so for sex-segregated organizations.  Judge Paine’s club (Belle Meade) did have a “lady membership,” which was priced less (but included no voting rights).  The Committee noted that “insofar as Lady Membership is preferable to other forms of membership, the exclusion of men from that category arguably constitutes another form of gender discrimination under the Code.”

Second, the opinion is worth reading because it offered some guidance to judges considering joining an organization: “Any judge considering membership in an organization should take steps to ensure that such membership would not appear improper. Naturally, those steps will differ to some degree depending on the particular circumstances. But we expect them to include, in all cases, a survey of the group’s membership, constitution, and bylaws. If ‘reasonable persons with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances would expect that the membership would be diverse in the absence of invidious discrimination,’ but the membership nevertheless is not diverse, the judge should err on the side of caution and decline membership.”  The Committee also offered a fuller vision of the two-year remediation exception (i.e., that a judge has up to two years to fix a discriminatory organization to which s/he already belongs): ”The two-year qualification must be read in light of Canon 2C’s safeguarding of the appearance of propriety. Thus, we believe that this provision is available only if a judge determines that diversification efforts by the judge could reasonably succeed. In those circumstances, he or she may continue to hold membership in diligent pursuit of those efforts for a reasonable period of time not to exceed two years.”

The full opinion can be read here.

Posted in Canon 2, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

New Drug Court Study and the Effectiveness of Ethics

Posted by kswisher on Sunday, August, 7, 2011

An ambitious study of drug courts was recently completed.  Funded by the National Institute of Justice, several collaborating organizations analyzed more than twenty drug courts over a five-year period.  Not surprisingly, the study contains many interesting observations, but what is particularly noteworthy is the correlation between judicial ethics and the effectiveness of those drug courts.  That is, almost all of the following findings would have been required or (at a minimum) encouraged as a matter of judicial ethics:

Role of the Judge: The primary mechanism by which drug courts reduce substance use and crime is through the judge. Drug court offenders believe that their judge treated them more fairly than the comparison group, including demonstrating greater respect and interest in them as individuals and greater opportunities to express their own voice during the proceedings. Furthermore, when offenders have more positive attitudes toward the judge, they have better outcomes. This was true across all offender subgroups when examining demographics, drug use history, criminality, and mental health. A separate analysis drawing upon the results of structured courtroom observations found, similarly, that drug courts whose judge was rated by members of the research team as exhibiting a more positive judicial demeanor (e.g., respectful, fair, attentive, enthusiastic, consistent/predictable, caring, and knowledgeable) produced better outcomes than other drug courts. Both analyses reaffirmed the central role of the judge.

Judges may well have performed these duties as a matter of principle, but it is doubly rewarding to see the principles leading to good results.  In light of the above conclusions, the study recommends these four points for drug court judges:

  • Hold frequent judicial status hearings; in light of previous research on this topic, consider increasing the frequency of status hearings for “high risk” participants in particular.
  • If the jurisdiction allows it, choose drug court judges carefully. Drug courts will be best served if administrators intentionally assign judges to the drug court who are committed to the model and interested in serving in this role.
  • Monitor “client satisfaction” with the judge.
  • Train judges on best practices regarding judicial demeanor and regarding how to communicate effectively with program participants.

The study can be found here.

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: Rotunda on White, Caperton, and Citizens United

Posted by kswisher on Sunday, August, 7, 2011

Professor Ron Rotunda’s most recent article, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, can be found here, and the abstract follows:

Recent times have witnessed strong lobbying efforts to move states away from electing judges to appointing them. Opponents of judicial elections repeatedly argue that the general public does not want judges who are bought by contributors. Of course, voters do not want those judges, yet the electorate repeatedly rejects efforts to move away from an elected judiciary.

When voters do choose judges, the conventional wisdom assures us that the results will be less partisan if the judges run in nonpartisan elections – where candidates run but do not disclose their political affiliation. However, empirical evidence does not support this frequent claim. Studies repeatedly show that judges elected in partisan elections are substantially more likely to be independent than judges selected in nonpartisan elections.

People who bemoan judicial elections often attack two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that appear to politicize the judiciary. One is Republican Party v. White (2002), which recognized the free speech rights of judicial candidates. They similarly criticize Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) as a pro-business decision that recognizes first amendment rights of corporations or individuals to spend money to engage in their political speech favoring their candidates. Yet, White simply evens the playing field by overturning restrictions that were really a form of incumbent-protection legislation. So too, the controversy surrounding Citizens United is misplaced. It does not favor business at the expense of unions. Instead it gives all entities, including unions and individuals, free speech rights that the government cannot restrict, which is why the ACLU supported the position of the petitioner and opposed the Federal Election Commission’s regulation. Still others view Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. (2009) as a case that will force judges to disqualify themselves if a party is related to an independent group that had supported the judicial candidate. It is too soon to judge the effect of Caperton, but there are plenty of indications in the five-person majority that the case has little growth.

It i[s] inevitable that money will flow into political campaigns: indeed, economic studies wonder why the major players do not invest more in these campaigns, given that so much money rides on the outcome. As long as politicians and judges decide billion dollar issues, there will be multi-million dollar campaigns. Fortunately, the empirical evidence to support the assertion that those who pays the money gets the judge they wants is decidedly mixed.

Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (2011).

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: Janoski-Haehlen on Social Media Use and the Courts

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Sunday, August, 7, 2011

Emily M. Janoski-Haehlen recently posted a draft of The Courts Are All a‘Twitter’: The Implications of Social Media Use in the Courts.  Her draft can be found here, and a general abstract follows:

Tweet, poke, post, friend, like, blog, link, comment, and share: the opportunities to communicate electronically using social media tools seem never ending. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, MySpace, and LinkedIn are just a few of the social media sites that allow people to communicate and “connect” with others across the world in seconds. E-mail and sending text messages are two other ways to communicate electronically, but neither e-mails nor text messages can keep up with the speed, accessibility, and popularity of social media. Social media is entrenched in our lives as evidenced by the fact that adult profiles on online social media sites are up from only 8% in 2005 to 47% in 2010. The legal profession has also jumped aboard the social media bandwagon with 40% of judges reporting they are on social media sites and 56% of attorneys reported having a presence on social media sites. Whichever “social networking” or communication method is chosen by an individual, the technology has made that communication instantaneous. Unfortunately, social media communication is also dangerous to the integrity of the courts.

Emily M. Janoski-Haehlen, The Courts Are All a‘Twitter’: The Implications of Social Media Use in the Courts, 46 Val. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011).

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A Supreme Victory for Government Ethics and Judicial Recusal

Posted by kswisher on Tuesday, June, 14, 2011

The Supreme Court just upheld Nevada’s Ethics in Government Law, which requires (in short) that public officials refrain from voting on matters in which they have personal interests.  In this case, a city council member voted to approve a casino despite the fact that his campaign manager and close friend had a financial interest in the casino’s development.  The Nevada Ethics Commission censured the council member, and in response, he brought a First Amendment challenge, claiming (among other things) that his vote constituted protected speech.  Rejecting the challenge, the Court concluded (again in short) that recusal rules in these circumstances do not (and did not ever) violate the First Amendment.  The Court was unanimous (as to the result, not as to the reasoning). 

The resulting opinions are relevant and indeed crucial for at least two reasons: (1) the seven-member opinion of the Court strongly validates the historical pedigree and constitutional legitimacy of American recusal laws, both legislative and judicial; and (2) both Justice Scalia (for seven justices) and Justice Kennedy (for his own pivotal self) noted that recusal rules may, quite understandably, be crafted more rigidly for the judiciary than for the legislature.

In particular, Justice Scalia acknowledged that ”[t]here are of course differences between a legislator’s vote and a judge’s, and thus between legislative and judicial recusal rules; nevertheless, there do not appear to have been any serious challenges to judicial recusal statutes as having unconstitutionally restricted judges’ First Amendment rights.”  Op. at 6 & n.3 (distinguishing White).  Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence that “[t]he Court has held that due process may require recusal in the context of certain judicial determinations, see Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. ___ (2009); but as [my concurrence] indicates, it is not at all clear that a statute of this breadth can be enacted to extend principles of judicial impartiality to a quite different context [i.e., the legislative and perhaps regulatory context].  The differences between the role of political bodies in formulating and enforcing public policy, on the one hand, and the role of courts in adjudicating individual disputes according to law, on the other, . . . may call for a different understanding of the responsibilities attendant upon holders of those respective offices and of the legitimate restrictions that may be imposed upon them.”

Here is the full opinion: Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan; see also coverage at the Election Law Blog.

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

The Sixth Circuit and Historically White Country Clubs

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Monday, June, 13, 2011

The Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit recently dismissed a complaint against Chief Bankruptcy Judge George C. Paine, concluding that the judge could permissibly remain a member of an exclusively white-male country club.  Although the club does have “lady members” and one African-American male non-voting member, the club’s 600 voting members are all white.  The complaint alleged, therefore, that the judge violated Canon 2A and Canon 2C of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.  The Council’s vote was deeply divided (10-8), with the slight majority voting to dismiss the complaint.  The dissent noted, among other points, that Judge Paine should have resigned at the moment (or at a minimum, within two years after) he realized that his efforts to change the Club’s discriminatory practices had failed.  [Read the full opinion here.]

Some press coverage follows: New York Times; Wall Street Journal; and The Tennessean.

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Supreme Court Justices Do Not Mind Being “Bound” by an Ethics Code so Long as They Are Not “Legally” Bound by an Ethics Code

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Sunday, May, 1, 2011

In a recent House budget hearing, Supreme Court Justices Breyer and Kennedy responded to questions from Rep. Jose Serrano (D-NY) regarding recent calls to bind the Supreme Court to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.  Justice Kennedy responded first by stating the “Code of Conduct does apply to [us], in the sense that we have agreed to be bound by them.”  He further stated that following the rules of ethics is “part of our oath and part of our obligation.”  Justice Kennedy went on to caution, however, that it would be “structurally unprecedented” and a “legal problem” for the Judicial Conference of the United States (composed of district and circuit judges) to bind the Supreme Court to its rules. 

Justice Breyer responded to the same question by stating that the Supreme Court Justices should be bound by the rules of ethics.  He did not, however, believe that they were bound in a “legal” sense, and any such binding should not be accomplished by legislation.  He also emphasized a few times that he follows the same rules—and the same procedures for interpreting those rules—as district and circuit judges.  He then arguably contradicted himself by adding that being a Supreme Court Justice requires “you to think about it in a different way,” because unlike other federal judges, “you have a duty to sit.”  [For a good work on the elusive “duty to sit,” see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 813 (2009); see also Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 317, 372-73 (2010).]

A video recording of the hearing can be seen here (the relevant testimony runs from approximately minute 26:00 through minute 33:00).

Posted in Judicial Ethics Generally | 1 Comment »

Judicial Ethics in the News

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Sunday, March, 27, 2011

Here are two noteworthy items in the world of judicial ethics:

(1) Adding heat to the recent law professors’ letter to Congress calling for ethical regulation of the Supreme Court, Representatives Chris Murphy and Anthony Weiner have introduced a bill named the Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act.  In essence, the resulting law would (1) apply the Code of Conduct for United States Judges to the Supreme Court Justices, (2) require Justices to issue reasons for recusing or failing to recuse themselves, and (3) provide a procedure for review whenever Justices deny motions to disqualify.   [For some critical commentary, see here, where Brookings asserts that similar reform proposals would transgress  Article III, § 1, vesting judicial power in “one Supreme Court.”]

(2) There has been yet another disappointment from one of the most disappointing cases in Wisconsin.  After the Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Gableman approved a misleading judicial campaign ad, after he then refused to recuse himself in a criminal matter in which his impartiality was questioned, and after the Wisconsin Supreme Court split straight down the conservative-liberal divide both in deciding whether to discipline Gableman and in deciding whether to review his failure to recuse himself (see here for details), we now learn that another Justice (Prosser) called the Chief Justice (Abrahamson) a “total bitch.”  He allegedly topped off this statement with a threat: “I will destroy you.”  If true, it should be noted that state judges on lower courts are often disciplined for such “intemperate” behavior. 

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

New York to Bar Judicial-Campaign-Contributing Attorneys from Courtroom for Two Years

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Monday, February, 28, 2011

In a recent move that has attracted much press, the New York State Administrative Board of the Courts has proposed a rule that would require attorneys who donate $2,500 and law firms that donate $3,500 to any judge be barred from appearing before that judge for a period of two years.  This proposed rule is more flexible than a 2003 task force proposal, which recommended a five-year ban on attorneys who had donated over $500 to any judge.  That proposed rule was said to be too onerous in the many less-populated areas, which often had only one full-time judge.

To read more on this important development, click on one or more of the following outlets: Brennan Center (calling the rule “a victory for recusal reform”); NY Times (a “bold step”); and The Wall Street Journal (“It would be one of the strictest disqualification rules in the nation”); see also generally Keith Swisher, Legal Ethics and Campaign Contributions: The Professional Responsibility to Pay for Justice, 24 Georgetown J. Legal Ethics (forthcoming 2011).

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Supremely Unethical

Posted by kswisher on Monday, February, 28, 2011

100 Law Professors have signed a letter to Congress (particularly, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees), urging that the Supreme Court should be bound, finally, by a code of judicial ethics.  Either the substance of the letter or (more likely) the methodology for collecting signatures is questionable, because several big names in judicial ethics are noticeably absent.  To the letter’s credit, however, the lack of binding Supreme Court ethics rules is indeed one of the single most embarrassing things in the judicial ethics field.  It is breathtakingly hypocritical that all of the federal (and state) judiciary underneath the Supreme Court must comply with a code to which the Court is not likewise held accountable.  The long-overdue letter can be read here.

Posted in Judicial Ethics Generally | 1 Comment »

Happy New Year

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Thursday, December, 30, 2010

Wishing all of our readers a Happy, Renewing — and of course, Ethical — New Year.

Looking forward to, among other great things, the judicial discipline summary for 2010 and a better disqualification mousetrap for 2011.  JEF

Posted in Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

New Scholarship: Pozen on Judicial Elections and Popular Constitutionalism

Posted by kswisher on Monday, December, 20, 2010

David Pozen has just married the practice of judicial elections to the popular theory of popular constitutionalism.  My first thought: If he is right that judicial elections are really the best “vehicle for achieving popular constitutionalism [by being] genuinely empowering without being anarchic, accessible to the masses yet mediated by professionals, [and] transformative yet realistic,” then I must not be a popular constitutionalist.  But his balanced and insightful analysis convinced me to read on.  Here is the abstract:

One of the most important recent developments in American legal theory is the burgeoning interest in “popular constitutionalism.” One of the most important features of the American legal system is the selection of state judges—judges who resolve thousands of state and federal constitutional questions each year—by popular election. Although a large literature addresses each of these subjects, scholarship has rarely bridged the two. Hardly anyone has evaluated judicial elections in light of popular constitutionalism, or vice versa. This Article undertakes that thought experiment. Conceptualizing judicial elections as instruments of popular constitutionalism, the Article aims to show, can enrich our understanding of both. The normative theory of popular constitutionalism can ground a powerful new set of arguments for and against electing judges, while an investigation into the states’ experience with elective judiciaries can help clarify a number of lacunae in the theory, as well as a number of ways in which its logic may prove self-undermining. The thought experiment may also be of broader interest. In elaborating the linkages between judicial elections and popular constitutionalism, the Article aims to shed light more generally on some underexplored connections (and tensions) among theories and practices of constitutional construction, democratic representation, jurisprudence, and the state courts.

David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 2047 (2010), a link to which can also be found in Articles.

Posted in Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Ethics Generally, Judicial Selection | 1 Comment »

 
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