The Judicial Ethics Forum (JEF)

An Academic Discussion of Judicial Ethics, Discipline & Disqualification

Archive for the ‘Canon 3’ Category

ABA Ethics Committee Remembers the “Other” Ethics Code

Posted by kswisher on Wednesday, February, 4, 2009

I presumably speak for the profession when I say that I generally hold the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (aka the Ethics Committee) in high esteem.  That said, when it recently revisited the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, it reminded me how rare those visits can be.  It appears that the Committee has directly addressed judicial ethics only two times in the last twenty-five years.  (I did not check prior to 1984.)  By any measure, then, the Code is suffering from a lack of attention.  Interestingly, the Ethics Committee even has an adjunct component dedicated to Code insight, the Judges Advisory Committee.  Interestingly as well, the only two opinions were both issued within the last two years.  That is cause for optimism, as it seems that the current Committee (although the roster has changed slightly) is more sensitive to judicial ethics problems. 

Your next question might understandably be — what problems managed to catch the Committee’s eye after all of these years?  The first is Formal Opinion 07-449, which addresses both the Model Rules and Model Code.  With respect to judges, the Committee concludes:

Pursuant to Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A), the judge in . . . a situation [in which she is being represented in an unrelated matter by an attorney appearing before her] must disqualify herself from the proceeding over which she is presiding if she maintains a bias or prejudice either in favor of or against her lawyer.  This disqualification obligation also applies when it is another lawyer in her lawyer’s firm who is representing a litigant before her. However, absent such a bias or prejudice for or against her lawyer, under Judicial Code Rule 2.11(C), the judge may continue to participate in the proceeding if the judge discloses on the record that she is being represented in the other matter by one of the lawyers, and the parties and their lawyers all consider such disclosure, out of the presence of the judge and court personnel, and unanimously agree to waive the judge’s disqualification.

If a judge is obligated to make disclosures in compliance with Judicial Code Rule 2.11(C), refuses to do so, and insists upon presiding over the matter in question, the lawyer’s obligation of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6 ordinarily would prohibit his disclosing to his other client his representation of the judge without the judge’s consent, rendering it impossible to obtain the client’s consent to the dual representation, as required by Model Rule 1.7(b). The lawyer’s continued representation of the judge in such a circumstance constitutes an affirmative act effectively assisting the judge in her violation of the Judicial Code, and thereby violates Model Rule 8.4(f). The lawyer (or another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm), in that circumstance, is obligated to withdraw from the representation of the judge under Model Rule 1.16.

The second opinion, Formal Opinion 08-452, is even more remarkable, in that it addresses only judicial ethics.  Although the opinion gives no clear cut answers, its conclusion is easy to summarize: “A judge who participates in fundraising activities on behalf of a court, including a ‘therapeutic’ or ‘problem-solving’ court, must limit the participation to activities permitted by Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 3.7(A).  The judge also must ensure that her conduct does not violate Judicial Code Rules 3.1 [general limitations on extrajudicial activities], 1.2 [promoting confidence in the judiciary], or 1.3 [avoiding the abuse of the prestige of judicial office].”  Perhaps the clearest answer is contained in Rule 3.7(A)(2), which permits direct solicitation for contributions “only when the persons being solicited are [a] members of the judge’s family or [b] other judges over whom the judge has no supervisory authority.”

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Campaigns, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

When the White Decision Is Irrelevant

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Thursday, January, 29, 2009

In a partial dissent to an order adopting a new code of judicial conduct based on the 2007 ABA Model Code, a justice of the Montana Supreme Court expressed reservations about the prohibition on a judge making public statements on pending cases in light of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.  The dissenting justice accepted it as a good faith effort to provide a rule that conforms with White, but noted that the rule may need to be revisited to accommodate future court decisions.

 

The dissenting justice need not be concerned.  White and its progeny raise no doubts about the constitutionality of the restriction on commenting on pending cases or any code provision that does not involve campaign or political conduct.

 

In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that a state cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues.  The crucial point for the majority was that the Court has “never allowed the government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters during an election.”

 

In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote that in choosing “to select its judges through contested popular elections instead of through an appointment system or a combined appointment and retention election system . . . the State has voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias . . . .”  Similarly, in his concurring opinion Justice Kennedy emphasized that “the State may not regulate the content of candidate speech merely because the speakers are candidates.”

 

Thus, the White decision focused exclusively on the needs of voters for information about the candidates in judicial election campaigns and the rights of candidates to communicate with those voters.  It did not announce any new-found, unassailable First Amendment rights for judges that would apply outside of the political realm.

 

In contrast to the announce clause, the restriction on commenting on pending cases applies to judges because they are judges, not because they are candidates, and applies regardless how judges are selected.  It does not prohibit speech based on content but simply requires a judge to make any comment on a pending case on the record in the case, in other words, when and where judges are supposed to be commenting on cases in fulfillment of their responsibilities.

 

No citizen has absolute First Amendment rights, and the public comment restriction reflects a balance most judges freely and willingly accept in deference to the justice system they serve and the public it protects.

 

By: Cindy Gray, Director, Center for Judicial Ethics, American Judicature Society

 

 

 

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Canon 5, Judicial Campaigns | 1 Comment »

More Appellate Court Discord

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Saturday, January, 17, 2009

The same day the Florida Supreme Court decided to publicly reprimand a court of appeal judge for filing a concurring opinion in which he personally attacked a fellow appellate judge (see my previous post), the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct dismissed complaints about the “vitriolic language” and “unprofessional personal attacks” against his colleagues by Chief Justice Tom Gray of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in several dissenting opinions.  Public Admonition of Gray (Dec. 18, 2008).  The attacks had “became media fodder and were the subject of growing criticism and ridicule in editorials, on internet blogs, and at judicial conferences.”  Noting that the judge had acknowledged the problems caused by the tone of his opinions and taken appropriate corrective measures to avoid that conduct in the future, the Commission “determined, in deference to the principle of judicial independence, that Justice Gray should not be disciplined for the content of his dissents.”

 

However, the Commission did publicly admonish Justice Gray for allowing his acrimonious relationship with his fellow justices to influence his conduct and judgment and failing to treat court personnel in a patient, dignified, and courteous manner.  The Commission found that Justice Gray began a “whisper campaign” against Justice Felipe Reyna by telling Republican party leaders that “somebody needs to talk to Felipe.  He’s not being a good Republican,” and that Justice Reyna “always votes with a liberal Democrat, [Justice] Bill Vance,” or words to that effect.  In addition, a security tape showed Justice Gray unlocking and entering Justice Vance’s private offices without permission and when no one else was present.  Justice Gray claimed that he was searching for a file but acknowledged that, after determining that the file was not in the office, he reviewed other papers on Justice Vance’s desk.  Justice Gray further testified that he has unlocked and entered the private offices of both Justice Vance and Justice Reyna in the past to look for files while the other justices were not present and had not given their permission.

 

Justice Vance and Justice Reyna testified about instances when Justice Gray treated court staff in a sarcastic, intimidating, and demeaning manner, including angry outbursts and personal attacks.  Justice Gray also commonly made statements implying that the chief clerk would be out of a job after January 1, 2009, and tried to convince the other justices to vote to fire the chief clerk and the accountant.  The Commission found that “mistreatment was sufficient to reduce some staff members to tears and has contributed to extremely low employee morale at the Court.”

 

by: Cindy Gray, Director, Center for Judicial Ethics, American Judicature Society

 

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3 | Leave a Comment »

Justice for Sale?

Posted by judicialethicsforum on Tuesday, January, 13, 2009

The Supreme Court has granted cert in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22.  The official question presented puts the issue bluntly:

[Acting Chief] Justice Brent Benjamin of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to recuse himself from the appeal of the $50 million jury verdict in this case, even though the CEO of the lead defendant spent $3 million supporting his campaign for a seat on the court — more than 60% of the total amount spent to support Justice Benjamin’s campaign — while preparing to appeal the verdict against his company.  After winning election to the court, Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the court’s 3-2 decision overturning that verdict. The question presented is whether Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself from participation in his principal financial supporter’s case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is difficult to conclude that the failure to recuse is anything but inexcusable (in addition to the Due Process Clause, see generally 1990 Canon 3E(1)(e) and 2007 Rule 2.11(A)), but to be fair, Chief Justice Benjamin has produced a lengthy defense of his refusal, which can be found here.  The Brennan Center has kindly posted the briefs in support of petitioner, including those of the ABA and Justice at Stake, all of which can be found here.  This destined-to-be watershed case is set for oral argument on March 3, 2009.  Stay tuned. 

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal | 2 Comments »

The Return of Impeachment

Posted by kswisher on Thursday, September, 18, 2008

While it has been nearly twenty years since the last federal judge was fully impeached, the two-decades-long (nearly) unblemished record may be shattered soon.  District Judge Thomas Porteous (E.D. La.) has been publicly censured for (among other accusations) soliciting money from attorneys appearing before him and filing false financial disclosure forms.  To read the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit’s underlying Order and Public Reprimand, click here (citing violations of 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Canons 1, 2A, 3C(1), 3D, 5C(1), (4), and (6) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges).  The Council even opines that Judge Porteous committed several federal crimes (such as honest-services mail fraud), in addition to the ethical violations.  The House Judiciary Committee has just formed a task force to consider the nuclear impeachment option.  

This is big.  The last federal judge impeached was former District Judge Alcee Hastings (S.D. Fla.) for allegedly accepting a bribe for lenient sentencing and then committing perjury.  Mr. Hastings then became a Congressman.   

At least one nagging question: If the reports are accurate that Judge Porteous has twice offered to retire in light of his struggles, is impeachment necessary?  To deter other federal judges from committing felonies?  To punish or judicially incapacitate the Judge?  Would not retirement plus criminal prosecution (if warranted) be sufficient?           

Posted in Canon 1, Canon 2, Canon 3, Canon 5 | Leave a Comment »

Ninth Circuit Judicial Council Investigation

Posted by kswisher on Wednesday, September, 10, 2008

The ABA Journal just ran a rather interesting, feature-length story concerning a judicial ethics inquiry involving Judge Manny Real (C.D. Cal.).  The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council is reportedly reviewing dozens of his cases for alleged errors of adjudication and problems of temperament.  For the full article, click here.  For my own views of whether bad criminal law adjudications warrant discipline (they can, and often do), click here.  (Because others undoubtedly know more about the judicial ethics implications of Judge Real’s saga — which apparently has a history of at least several years – please comment below for our collective benefit.)      

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Ethics Generally | Leave a Comment »

Maiden Post: The Importance of Judicial Ethics

Posted by kswisher on Wednesday, July, 16, 2008

Judicial ethics is a curiously under-, and in many ways un-, explored field.  It could not be more important, however.  On its most important level (perhaps arguably), compare Brown v. Board of Education (good?), with Korematsu v. United States (evil?).  Compare as well Buck v. Bell (Holmes, J.) (upholding forced sterilization law on the basis of its perceived—now debunked—societal good), with Lawrence v. Texas.  Granted, judicial ethics is more commonly thought of by the more (seemingly) mundane rules embodied in (more or less from state to state) the Model Codes of Judicial Conduct, but these too are fascinating.  Take, as one randomly picked illustration, the judge who, during a death penalty case, allegedly engaged in an undisclosed romantic relationship with the prosecutor, yet the defendant, Charles Hood, received the death penalty.

There is more.  Judicial ethics is inextricably tied to enforcement, namely, judicial discipline, and equally tied to the propriety to sit, judicial disqualification/recusal.  This Forum, the first of its kind, takes on all three subjects — judicial ethics, discipline, and disqualification.  

Fortunately, judicial ethics offers us much room in which to disagree, respectfully of course.  These disagreements can range from the seemingly trivial (e.g., stock ownership) to the seemingly world-changing (e.g., Bush v. Gore).  Let’s discuss. 

 

Posted in Canon 2, Canon 3, Judicial Disqualification & Recusal | Leave a Comment »

 
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